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A B S T R A C T
Drawing on the home country literature, we argue that firms headquartered or located in countries with strong
labor protection may face challenges in their domestic operations. These firms are likely to initiate offshoring to
enhance operational efficiency. Building on this argument, we also examine the boundary conditions moderating
this proposed effect including labor productivity and employee stock ownership. Results based on a sample of
information technology firms operating within five developed countries during 1990–2010 provide support for
these arguments. These findings suggest that offshoring can be a partial exit strategy for firms to address the
institutional challenges in their home country.
“Rules on severance pay and employee rights make it expensive and
time consuming for the German software maker SAP to manage its
costs” (Boudette, 2002).
1. Introduction
One of the fastest growing themes in international business (IB)
research is the impact of home country on firms (Cuervo-Cazurra,
Meyer, & Ramamurti, 2015; Estrin, Meyer, Nielsen, & Nielsen, 2016;
Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013; Marano, Arregle, Hitt,
Spadafora, & Van Essen, 2016). The home country environment is
crucial for firms to tap into the global market, because global market,
provides important resources and assets that the firms can use for op-
erations abroad (Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2017; Luo & Tung,
2007). Overall, home country institutions “facilitate both production
and distribution of generated rents” (Hoskisson et al., 2013, 1297).
Consequently, research shows that home country conditions may
greatly influence firm strategies (Chakrabarti, Vidal, & Mitchell, 2011;
Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Shi, Sun, Yan, & Zhu, 2017), inter-
nationalization motives (Luo & Wang, 2012; Witt & Lewin, 2007), and
performance outcomes (Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010; McGahan &
Victer, 2010).
Within the home country literature, researchers maintain that
emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) may differ in their
internationalization strategies vis-à-vis firms based in developed
countries (Luo & Zhang, 2016). EMNEs may to be more active in going
abroad in order to cope with the challenges of home country opera-
tions. For example, some firms operating within emerging markets
actively engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) in order to acquire
more advanced know-how (Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014, 2017;
Kedia, Gaffney, & Clampit, 2012; Li, Li, & Shapiro, 2012). As useful as
these studies are, little research has specifically examined: (1) whether
other crucial home country resources—especially labor—may matter,
and (2) how firms operating within developed countries use other in-
ternationalization strategies such as offshoring in response to the par-
ticular home country conditions.
The purpose of our study is to start addressing these important gaps.
We ask: (1) How does home country labor protection affect firm off-
shoring? (2) Which boundary conditions will shape the relationship
between home country labor protection and firm offshoring? We
highlight the role of labor protection because stringent labor protection
within the home country may hinder firm operational efficiency and
effectiveness. When home country labor protection may lead to in-
stitutional challenges for domestic operations, we find that firms op-
erating within home countries characterized by heavy labor protection
may actively consider offshoring. Drawing on the home country lit-
erature (Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014, 2017; Cuervo-Cazurra
et al., 2015; Estrin et al., 2016; Hoskisson et al., 2013), we argue that
firms headquartered or located in home countries characterized by re-
latively heavy labor protection are more inclined to undertake off-
shoring. This argument is also consistent with the varieties of capitalism
(VOC) literature, which suggests that labor is an important actor within
the home country (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, &
Paunescu, 2010).
Building on this baseline prediction, we also examine the boundary
conditions that may moderate this proposed effect including labor
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productivity and employee stock ownership. Results based on a sample
of firms in five developed countries’ information technology industry
(Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States) from 1990 to
2010 provide support for these arguments. These findings suggest that
stringent home country labor protection can significantly motivate
firms to undertake offshoring.
Our contributions are twofold. First, our study contributes to the
home country literature (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015; Hoskisson et al.,
2013; Xia, Ma, Lu, & Yiu, 2014). Researchers contend that home
countries may provide essential resources and assets, but can also create
difficulties that hinder business operations. When faced with these
challenges firms may seek opportunities elsewhere, often abroad
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014, 2017; Luo & Wang, 2012; Peng
et al., 2008; Yamakawa, Peng, & Deeds, 2008). Although this insight
has been proposed, most studies examine firms operating within
emerging markets so that whether or not firms in developed countries
have similar strategies is not well-understood (for an exception, see
Witt & Lewin, 2007). We propose that firms based in developed coun-
tries may opt to reduce their exposure to the home country environ-
ment via offshoring. Specifically, offshoring can be viewed as a partial
exit strategy for responding to potential constraints within the home
country.
Second, our findings also have implications for both the VOC lit-
erature (Carney, Gedajlovic, & Yang, 2009; Hall & Soskice, 2001;
Jackson & Deeg, 2008) and the offshoring literature (Contractor,
Kumar, Kunda, & Pedersen, 2010; Doh, Bunyaratavej, & Hahn, 2009).
On the one hand, whereas the VOC literature notes that labor plays
different roles in different countries (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003, 2010;
Van Essen, Oosterhout, & Heugens, 2013), few studies examine how
firms respond to labor protection within their home countries. Our
paper adds to this literature by considering offshoring as a viable re-
sponse. On the other hand, while offshoring has received considerable
scholarly attention (Contractor et al., 2010; Rodriguez & Nieto, 2016),
prior studies largely emphasize host country factors rather than home
country conditions. We endeavor to make and substantiate the case that
home country context may be an important determinant for firm off-
shoring.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Home country context and firm internationalization
The importance of home country context has long been discussed in
the literature. Resources such as technology, capital, and labor acquired
at home base can be useful for operating abroad (Porter, 1990).
Hoskisson et al. (2013) contend that “a country’s endowed factor
markets significantly determine its economic opportunity set” (p.
1297). Marano et al. (2016) also maintain that home countries “play a
crucial role in firms’ ability to develop and maintain their competitive
advantage at home” (p. 1077). At the same time scholars suggest that
the home country effect may differ between emerging markets and
developed countries. Since emerging markets are often less developed
in terms of capital, product, and labor markets (Khanna & Palepu,
1997), firms based in these countries may not be able to maintain
competitive advantage. In order to overcome such a disadvantage, firms
operating within emerging markets may be more active in entering
global markets (Peng, 2012).
Prior research shows that EMNEs may leverage the assets and re-
sources that they can procure from the home country as a “springboard”
to facilitate their foreign operations (Luo & Tung, 2007). Similarly,
firms that regard home country operations as more costly are more
inclined to engage in FDI (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015; Luo & Wang,
2012; Xia et al., 2014; Yamakawa et al., 2008). Since home country
operations are characterized by “rising transaction costs associated with
continuing uncertainty” (Luo & Wang, 2012: 249), firms operating
within emerging markets may be inclined to undertake FDI (Cuervo-
Cazurra et al., 2015; Luo & Wang, 2012; Peng, 2012; Yamakawa et al.,
2008).
However, studies on the home country effect largely focus on firms
operating within emerging markets, while whether or not firms based in
developed countries may behave similarly is less clear—a challenge
that we take up. We contend that firms operating within relatively
developed countries may encounter challenges when home country
labor protection is stringent. These firms may accordingly use off-
shoring as a way to streamline their domestic operations. Following
Manning, Massini, and Lewin (2008), we define offshoring as “the
process of sourcing any business task, process, or function supporting
domestic operations from abroad” (p. 35). Since offshoring is “a specific
manifestation of firm internationalization” (Schmeisser, 2013: 390), the
use of offshoring in this article specifically refers to “offshore out-
sourcing.”
2.2. Labor protection in a world with varying capitalism
The level of labor protection is not the same across different coun-
tries (OECD, 2004). Countries impose different rules on labor, including
the conditions for hiring and firing employees, the maximum number of
working hours per week, and minimum wages. These arrangements are
designed to provide social protection for workers (Botero, Djankov, La
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004; Ochel, 2009). Botero et al.
(2004) argue that “every country in the world has established a com-
plex system of laws and institutions intended to protect the interests of
workers” (p. 1339). For example, a typical employee who has worked
for four to five years at a firm is entitled to one and a half months of
severance pay in Japan, only half a month of severance pay in Britain,
and zero severance pay in the United States. Similarly, employers can
only fire workers in France and Germany with an advance notice period
of seven to eight months, but in the United States this notice period is
much shorter.
According to the VOC literature, these varying levels of labor pro-
tection reflect countries’ different institutional and social arrangements
(Crouch & Streek, 1997; Hall & Soskice, 1991; Whitley, 1999). Two
points can be highlighted. First, when studying home country differ-
ences it is imperative to consider other actors in addition to firms per se,
including the financial system, education system, and industrial rela-
tions (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Capron & Guillen, 2009). For example,
as the education system provides the foundation for employees’
knowledge and skills, a country’s education and training system cannot
be overlooked. Hall and Gingerich (2009) contend that “in order to
prosper, firms must engage with other actors in multiple spheres of the
political economy” (p. 452). Countries can accordingly be conceived as
“systems of interconnected systems” (OECD, 1999: 23).
Second, key actors in a country such as labor may “have a diverse
set of socially constituted identities and interests” (Aguilera & Jackson,
2010: 492). The VOC literature suggests two distinctive coordination
methods: the liberal market economy (LME) versus the coordinated
market economy (CME). In LMEs such as Britain and the United States
the relationships among actors within a country are more characterized
by arm’s-length exchanges where the price signal is the primary me-
chanism for actors to determine their behaviors. In contrast, in CMEs
such as France and Germany, actors’ decisions and behaviors are more
guided by non-market relationships rather than price. As these re-
lationships place less emphasis on short-run gains and losses, actors
within CMEs tend to have a shared view of their prospects and will
behave accordingly. For example, if firms do not perform well finan-
cially in an LME, they are unlikely to effectively raise capital from the
market. In contrast, financial actors (e.g., banks) within a CME tend to
be more patient and embedded such that they are willing to provide
long-term capital (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010: 527).
The focus of this paper is labor protection within the home country.
We opt to highlight labor because it represents a critical stakeholder of
firms (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003, 2010). When a country’s institutional
D.H. Weng, M.W. Peng Journal of World Business 53 (2018) 632–640
633
arrangements provide greater labor protection, these arrangements will
alter “the structure of rights and responsibilities among the parties with
a stake in the firm” (Aoki, 2000: 11). We primarily consider home
countries because they are the foundations of many firms (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2011; Hoskisson et al., 2013; Lee & Makhija, 2009). Lee and
Makhija (2009) maintain that “the domestic economic environment is a
key context in which to engage in business activities” (p. 407). More-
over, Cuervo-Cazurra (2011) notes that the impact of home country on
firms “is most noticeable…when the home country represents the main
source of resources to the firm” (p. 383). We contend that home country
labor protection will be a crucial determinant behind firm offshoring
decisions.
3. Hypotheses
3.1. Home country labor protection and firm offshoring
Labor protection within the home country can affect firm business
operations in two ways. First, whether labor protection is strong or
weak will make a difference for firms to fully utilize employees’ skills
and talents. When employment protection is not strong, firms can ef-
fectively motivate and discipline employees. For example, if employees
do not perform satisfactorily, managers can discharge them without
worrying about breaking labor laws (Gibbons & Katz, 1991). However,
such managerial discretion may be low in countries with strong labor
protection. Ichino and Riphahn (2001) find that when workers receive
greater employment protection, the number of absence days per week
doubled. For this reason international investors are often reluctant to
acquire targets in countries where labor receives strong institutional
protection (Alimov, 2015; Capron & Guillen, 2009).
Second, heavy labor protection may reduce workers’ motivations to
develop new skills, thereby hampering firms’ adaptation capacities to-
ward the changing world. When workers are highly protected, the labor
market will become rigid because burdensome labor rules discourage
firms from hiring new employees (Nickell, 1997). Firms are also less
likely to hire new employees since heavy labor protection diminishes
employee mobility. However, recruiting employees who possess new
skills from the external labor market is critical for firms to remain in-
novative and competitive (Kaiser, Kongsted, & Rønde, 2015). When the
hiring of new employees is hindered, firms may have difficulty updating
and renewing their knowledge, resulting in competitive disadvantage.
Offshoring can be a way out of these problems. According to Oliver
(1991), the pressure from operating in a given context may prompt
firms to seek opportunities in other places. By doing so, firms can
“escape from institutional rules and expectations” (Oliver, 1991: 154).
Xia et al. (2014) suggest that as domestic competition increases, firms
may actively consider going abroad as a way to cope with the un-
certainty with home country operations. Witt and Jackson (2016) assert
that when domestic operations become challenging, firms the firms
may “move their operations, in part or in whole, to institutional con-
texts that better support these operations” (p. 797). This reasoning
suggests that offshoring can be a valuable approach for firms in coun-
tries with stringent labor protection to enhance operational flexibility
and efficiency.
In addition, offshoring can also help firms gain access to fresh ideas
and knowledge beyond their home bases. Porter (1990) argues that
countries have different strengths, while Hall and Soskice (2001)
maintain that it is necessary for firms to engage in cross-border activ-
ities. Witt and Jackson (2016) contend that cross-border business ac-
tivities may need to be initiated for firms to maintain a competitive
edge. Since offshoring can help firms streamline their operations while
achieving their goals (Castellani & Pieri, 2013; Mihalache, Jansen,
Bosch, & Volberda, 2012; Nieto & Rodriguez, 2011), firms located
within the countries with stronger labor protection may be apt to seek
support from suppliers overseas. Specifically:
Hypothesis 1. The stronger labor protection is in the home country, the
more likely that firms headquartered or located in that country would
undertake offshoring.
Before proceeding, we must elaborate two clarifications regarding
Hypothesis 1. First, there are two offshoring approaches: (1) offshoring
where firms obtain needed input and services from independent sup-
pliers located in other countries (Contractor et al., 2010; Doh et al.,
2009; Lewin, Massini, & Peeters, 2009), and (2) captive sourcing where
firms seek foreign materials via their foreign affiliates. Our study fo-
cuses on the former because it “requires a lower level of resource
commitment and permits firms to choose the supplier that delivers the
maximum advantage in each case” (Rodriguez & Nieto, 2016: 1738).1
Second, the literature also recognizes that location choices are im-
portant in offshoring decisions. Although one may intuitively associate
offshoring locations with less developed countries (e.g., China or India),
recent studies indicate that this may not necessarily be the case. For
instance, Mudambi and Venzin (2010) argue that cost reduction is not
the sole motivation for offshoring, and that knowledge seeking can be
an important motivation (p. 1510). Other authors also maintain that
firms may seek more advanced input and materials from more devel-
oped countries (Demirbag & Glaister, 2010). We accordingly consider
both more and less developed countries as possible destinations for
offshoring.
3.2. Boundary conditions
We argue that strong labor protection may adversely affect opera-
tions such that firms operating within countries with strong labor
protection would be motivated to undertake offshoring (Hypothesis 1).
As a baseline argument this hypothesis assumes that all firms have
identical attributes and will react to a given home country context in a
similar manner. However, the likelihood of offshoring may vary across
firms because firms are “heterogeneous in their perception of institu-
tional constraints and opportunities” (Guler & Guillen, 2010: 186). We
must therefore consider the boundary conditions that may moderate
this proposed effect. Our study considers two such factors including
labor productivity and employee stock ownership. We discuss labor
productivity first.
3.2.1. Boundary condition: Labor productivity
Different firms, even those operating within the same home country
and industry, may have different labor uses. In contrast with some firms
utilizing less skilled labor with lower productivity for operations, other
firms possess more skilled workers who can develop novel products or
fresh services while demonstrating higher efficiency. For this latter
group of firms, workers have a more crucial role given their capacity to
generate higher-value output (Aw, Roberts, & Xu, 2011). Since workers
of such quality are often in limited supply (Peteraf, 1993: 180), firms
must spend resources in order to attract and retain them. We consider
labor productivity as a boundary condition that may change the effect
of home country labor protection.
Specifically, we posit that the effect of home country labor protec-
tion may be stronger for firms that demonstrate higher labor pro-
ductivity. Frank and Obloj (2014) indicate that while highly skilled
employees are more productive, they also enjoy higher bargaining
power, which allows them to demonstrate non-cooperative behaviors
that erode firm performance. By this logic when firms rely more on
skilled employees for operations, they may run into greater difficulties
when operating within countries with more stringent labor protection.
For example, if firms ask for additional input from these employees
(such as overtime) but home country institutions allow employees to
1 We note that this argument does not imply that captive sourcing is either less im-
portant or less effective. In the Methods section we describe how we differentiate off-
shoring from captive sourcing.
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refuse, then firms may easily run into problems. Moreover, highly
productive employees tend to have stronger bargaining power that may
disrupt firm operations (Coff, 1997; Williamson, Wachter, & Harris,
1975). Since strong labor protection can place firms in a dis-
advantageous position when managing workers, firms utilizing more
productive workers while operating within home countries with strong
labor protection may have greater motivation to undertake offshoring.
In contrast, the effect of home country labor protection may be
reduced for firms with relatively lower labor productivity. Firms that
demonstrate lower labor productivity typically employ workers pos-
sessing less specialized skills. Since their skills and experiences are not
particularly valuable, these workers do not have “a stronger position to
appropriate rent” (Coff, 1999: 119). Whereas stringent home country
labor protection may create challenges for operations, firms utilizing
less productive workers may not encounter major issues and thus may
not proactively undertake offshoring. Thus:
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between home country labor protection
and the likelihood of offshoring will be stronger for firms with higher
labor productivity.
3.2.2. Boundary condition: Employee stock ownership
Employee stock ownership is another factor that may influence the
effect of home country labor protection. Agency theory maintains that
the interests of employees as agents may not completely align with
those of the firm (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). One
way to align their interests with those of principals is to adopt employee
stock ownership. Having a financial stake in the firm motivates em-
ployees to make greater contributions toward employers (Park, Kruse,
& Sesil, 2004). In fact, stock ownership can encourage “key employees
to make firm-specific investments” (Wang & Barney, 2006: 469),
thereby creating value for the firm.
The effect of home country labor protection may vary depending on
whether or not firms use employee stock ownership. Firms that do not
use employee stock ownership but operate within countries with strong
labor protection may have stronger motivation to undertake offshoring.
For such firms it is more difficult for management to reach a consensus
with employees, since workers without a stake in their firms may be less
willing to cooperate with employers. These employees may bargain
aggressively with employers and demand better treatment (Tucker,
1993). Earlier studies report that employee stock ownership may in-
fluence worker cooperation (Kim & Ouimet, 2014). Since a lack of
employee stock ownership breeds challenges for domestic operations,
firms that do not use employee stock ownership but operate within
countries characterized by stringent labor protection may have stronger
motivation to undertake offshoring.
In contrast, the effect of home country labor protection may be
weakened for firms that use employee stock ownership, because em-
ployees are apt to identify with firm goals and may act with these goals
in mind (Pierce, Rubenfeld, & Morgan, 1991). Employee stock owner-
ship fundamentally “align[s] employee goals with those of the firm”
(Coff, 1999: 386) and serves as a “vehicle for profit-sharing to en-
courage productive effort” (Wang, He, & Mahoney, 2009: 1269). Firms
adopting employee stock ownership are therefore likely to win support
from employees, even though offshoring may jeopardize some em-
ployees’ jobs. Park et al. (2004) contend that employee stock ownership
can “build a more cooperative culture, which can increase employee
commitment” (p. 3). On this basis we propose that firms adopting
employee stock ownership while being headquartered or operating in
countries with strong labor protection would have reduced motivation
to undertake offshoring. Specifically:
Hypothesis 3. The relationship between home country labor protection




We leverage a sample of firms operating within the information
technology industry from 1990 to 2010 (inclusive) for two reasons.
First, focusing on a single industry is useful in order to control for in-
dustry effects (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 1990: 20). Second, since the pro-
ducts within this industry are highly standardized, firms may be more
apt to consider seeking the input and materials provided by foreign
suppliers. In this study information technology firms are defined as
those operating within the software and hardware areas (two-digit
standard industrial classification [SIC] codes including 35, 36, and 38).
In our study, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States are
considered home countries for firms since these countries collectively
account for approximately 70 percent of the world’s information tech-
nology production (Dedrick & Kraemer, 2011).
If a sample is non-random, then any statistical conclusions drawn
may be inaccurate to the extent that certain firm attributes may affect
motivations to engage in offshoring. Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood
(2012) recommend overcoming this issue by using the propensity score
matching (PSM) method. The PSM requires a set of comparable firms
located within the aforementioned home countries. We accordingly
proceeded by identifying firms that were either headquartered or lo-
cated in these countries from the Osiris database. Since Germany has
relatively little coverage compared to all other home countries, we
began with 60 firms in Germany that included more complete financial
information as our initial sample. Based on this initial set, we identified
four other firm sets with similar characteristics located in Britain,
France, Japan, and the United States. Using the Stata code
“PSMATCH2” (Leuven & Sianesi, 2003), we determined the similarity
by comparing the differences between firms in terms of industry af-
filiation (four-digit SIC), age, size (assets), financial performance
(ROA), and ownership (public or private). Based on the calculated
propensity score we identified the closest one-to-one match for the
German firms with the shortest Mahalanobis distance to another
country. This led to a sample of 300 firms. Using a series of ANOVA
tests, we find that our sample firms from each home country do not
differ significantly in terms of company age (p=0.42), size (p=0.35),
and financial performance (p=0.55).
4.2. Dependent variable
The dependent variable offshoring is a binary variable indicating
whether or not a firm engaged in offshoring during a given year
(1= yes and 0=no). Following Griffith, Harmancioglu, and Dorge
(2009), we identified firms’ offshoring via content analysis (Weber,
1990). First, we generated a list of keywords describing offshoring,2
based on which we then manually searched Factiva for press mentions.
Consistent with earlier research (Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2012; Tang,
Qian, Chen, & Shen, 2015), we focused on major business publications
including BusinessWeek; Economist; Financial Times; New York Times; and
Wall Street Journal. The initial search yielded 580 news articles with
mentions of offshoring for the sample firms within the observation
period. We further examined these articles manually and documented
all incidents. After removing duplicate reports; we were left with 410
unique offshoring incidents. In order to ensure that the data coding was
reliable, we asked an independent research assistant unaware of the
study’s purpose to read all of the news reports we had singled out and to
code these offshoring incidents. The agreement rate was high (97%)
and discrepancies were resolved through discussion. While most reports
did not reveal the exact offshoring amount, 25 (6%) of them did and the
average was US$4.64 million per contract.
2 The full list of the keywords is available on request.
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4.3. Independent and moderating variables
Following Alimov (2015) and Capron and Guillen (2009), we
measured home country labor protection using the employment protec-
tion legislation (EPL) strictness index from the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This index assesses
employment protection legislation within a country using 18 basic
items that can be grouped into three areas: (1) employment protection
for regular workers against individual dismissal, (2) specific require-
ments for collective dismissal, and (3) regulation of temporary forms of
employment. Based on these 18 basic items the OECD researchers de-
veloped a four-step procedure for constructing the EPL strictness index
that allows for meaningful comparison across both countries and time
periods (for a summary of the index construction process, see the 2004
edition of the OECD Employment Outlook). The time-varying indicator
variable ranges from 0 to 6 with higher values suggesting greater labor
protection within a country. Among all of the home countries covered
in this study, we find that Germany (3.06) and France (2.69) offer re-
latively greater labor protection, while Japan (1.84), Britain (1.17), and
the United States (0.79) offer relatively less.
Our first moderating variable is labor productivity. At the firm level
this notion describes the degree of productivity by a firm’s employees as
a whole. One way to measure firm productivity is to consider a firm’s
total value added as the sum of all the input into its operations
(Lieberman & Dhawan, 2005). Barney (2001) maintains that a firm’s
value added can be computed by considering all activities in the pro-
duction process, including depreciation, amortization, fixed charges,
interest expenses, labor and related expenses, pension and retirement
expenses, net income before taxes, and rental expenses. Following
Barney (2001), we obtained information on the above components from
Osiris, calculated the sum of the above activities, and then scaled this
sum over the number of firm employees. Since the value of this variable
varies considerably across firms, we standardized it in order to ease
interpretation (mean=0 and standard deviation= 1). The greater the
values, the higher the firm’s labor productivity.
Consistent with Wang et al. (2009), we measured employee stock
ownership using a binary variable coded 1 if a firm granted ownership to
employees, and 0 if it did not. While a continuous measure is generally
more informative, the proportion of firms that adopted employee stock
ownership is not high in our data. The average of firms that did so is 3%
with a maximum of only 16%. A binary variable is therefore sufficient
to distinguish firms that adopted employee stock ownership from those
that did not.
4.4. Control variables
Our models included several control variables that may correlate
with the likelihood of firm offshoring. First, since large and established
firms may have more resources that may affect their tendency to pursue
offshoring, we controlled for firm age and firm size (measured by assets
where both are logarithms). Furthermore, public firms may have
greater capacities than their private counterparts to seek external re-
sources supporting their operations. Accordingly, we coded a dummy
variable public firm (1 if firms were public, and 0 otherwise). Moreover,
relative to domestic firms, MNEs that have subsidiaries in foreign
countries may have different inclination to obtain materials and input
from overseas. We controlled for this effect by including a dummy
variable captive sourcing (1 if firms had subsidiaries within a given
foreign country, and 0 otherwise).
Second, firms that had engaged in offshoring before may have a
greater tendency to do so again. We coded a variable prior offshoring
measuring the number of times a firm initiated any offshoring activities
with a given host country during the study period. Moreover, offshoring
may also be propelled by firm performance. Although low performance
firms may have motivation to source materials and input from abroad,
high performance firms may also be interested in utilizing these
resources. Since both predictions have merits, we did not expect firm
performance to behave in a particular way. Nonetheless, we included
firm performance (measured as return on assets) in our model.
Third, a firm’s tendency to undertake offshoring may be affected by
domestic labor costs. We controlled for this effect by including home
country labor costs (measured as monthly wages in logarithm). Similarly,
the decision to procure materials from a host country may depend on
the labor costs within that country. Labor cost data were obtained from
the International Labour Organization (ILO). In order to ensure that the
unit of labor costs was comparable, we converted the local currency
into US dollars using information obtained from the Exchange Rate
Archives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Finally, we created
a set of year and industry dummies (at the four-digit SIC level) in order
to control for period- and industry-fixed effects.
4.5. Model estimation
We are interested in how home country labor protection may affect
the motivations of firms within a given home country to undertake
offshoring. When considering the variables of interest, a firm’s like-
lihood of offshoring can be expressed as follows:
Offshoring ijt = α+ β HomeLaborit-1 + γ HomeLaborit-
1× LaborProductivityit-1 + δ HomeLaborit-1 × EmpOwnershipit-1 + ζ
Controls+ ε
where i indexes the firm, j a given host country, and t the year.
HomeLabor is home country labor protection, LaborProductivity labor
productivity, and EmpOwnership employee stock ownership. α is the
intercept, β, γ, and δ are the coefficients of theoretical interest, and ε is
the residual.
Three aspects of our model merit explanation. First, the dependent
variable is the probability that a firm engaged in offshoring activities
within a given host country during a given year. We modeled this
probability because it provides fine-grained information regarding the
firm’s offshoring decisions. Host country characteristics are shown to
play a crucial role in firm offshoring decisions (Contractor et al., 2010;
Doh et al., 2009). We note that our conclusions remain consistent when
the dependent variable is modeled as whether or not firms pursued
offshoring during a given year.
Second, the identification of possible host countries that prospective
offshoring firms may have considered also requires articulation. While a
prospective offshoring firm may have evaluated several host countries
before eventually deciding on one, it would be unrealistic to include all
possible foreign countries in this estimation. Prior research maintains
that host countries that would be perceived as attractive include: (1)
foreign countries with which the focal firm had offshoring before, and
(2) foreign countries with which industry counterparts (with the same
two-digit SIC code) had offshoring (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Fol-
lowing this approach we identified 16 possible host countries or re-
gions: Britain, Canada, China, Germany, France, Hong Kong, Israel,
India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Switzer-
land, Taiwan, and the United States. For each sample firm we created a
dummy variable reflecting whether or not it engaged in offshoring with
the host country during a given year.
Finally, because the dependent variable is binary in nature, we used
the logit model for estimation (Long & Freese, 2003). Combining all of
the available information provided 19,555 firm-country-year observa-
tions for analysis. All regressions used robust standard errors clustered
at the firm level.
5. Results
5.1. Main findings
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. We used the mean-centering
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approach to create the interactions. All variance inflation factor (VIF)
values are below the recommended cut-off point of 10, suggesting that
multicollinearity is not a major issue.
Table 2 reports the regression results and Model 1 presents the
baseline estimations including all control variables. Model 2 in-
vestigates the main effect of home country labor protection. Models 3
and 4 introduce one interaction variable each, and the full model is
represented by Model 5. All models are highly significant (p < 0.001),
suggesting that our predictors have significant statistical power.
Hypothesis 1 argues that firms operating within home countries
with strong labor protection are likely to undertake offshoring. In
Models 2 to 5 we find a positive coefficient for home country labor
protection. For instance, in Model 2 home country labor protection
bears a positive estimate (β=0.621, p < 0.01). This result can be
interpreted as follows: a one-unit increase in home country labor pro-
tection will raise a firm’s likelihood of offshoring by five percent. Since
the average probability of initiating offshoring to a given country is not
high in our data (approximately two percent), the effect of home
country labor protection is non-trivial. When using the average off-
shoring amount of our data, the estimate also implies that a one-unit
increase of home country labor protection will lead to an offshoring
contract of US$149,872. This magnitude supports Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 contends that the effect of home country labor pro-
tection would be stronger for firms with higher labor productivity.
According to Model 3, the interaction of home country labor protection
and labor productivity is positive and significant (β=8.864,
p < 0.01). This result suggests that labor productivity intensifies the
effect of home country labor protection, and Hypothesis 2 is accord-
ingly supported.
Hypothesis 3 further proposes that the influence of labor protection
in the home country will be weaker for firms adopting employee stock
ownership. As indicated in Model 4, the interaction of home country
labor protection and employee stock ownership is negative and sig-
nificant (β=−0.171, p < 0.01). This finding supports Hypothesis 3.
In order to better understand how these two moderating variables
change the main effect, we plot the interaction effects in Figs. 1 and 2.
The patterns revealed in these two figures are consistent with our
predictions. For example, Fig. 1 suggests that although firms with lower
labor productivity have higher propensities to seek offshoring than
firms with higher labor productivity under the condition of low home
country labor protection, as home country labor protection increases
the difference between these two groups of firms diminishes. When
home country labor protection reaches a high level, then firms with
higher labor productivity exhibit greater propensities to undertake
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations.
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. Offshoring 0.02 0.05 –
2. Home country labor protection 2.53 0.71 0.03 –
3. Labor productivity 0.00 1.00 −0.04 −0.04 –
4. Employee stock ownership 0.10 0.30 −0.02 0.16 0.04 –
5. Firm age 2.92 0.85 0.01 0.15 0.06 −0.09 –
6. Firm size 13.72 3.45 0.03 0.28 0.01 0.13 0.19 –
7. Public firm 0.57 0.49 0.04 0.15 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.08 –
8. Captive sourcing 0.52 0.49 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.08 −0.07 0.38 –
9. Prior offshoring 0.04 0.24 0.27 −0.02 0.00 −0.02 0.00 0.03 −0.01 0.01 –
10. Firm performance 0.13 2.41 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.00 –
11. Home country labor cost 7.87 0.22 −0.02 0.60 0.01 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.02 −0.01 0.01 –
12. Host country labor protection 1.12 0.76 −0.03 −0.04 −0.02 −0.01 −0.03 −0.02 −0.01 −0.00 −0.11 −0.01 −0.05 –
13. Host country labor cost 7.53 1.18 0.01 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 −0.00 −0.01 −0.36 –
Notes: N=19555; correlations with absolute values exceeding 0.03 are significant at p < 0.05.
Table 2
Results of Logit Estimates.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Home country labor protection (HCLP) 0.621*** (0.213) 0.648*** (0.221) 0.626*** (0.214) 0.684*** (0.231)
HCLP× Labor productivity 8.864*** (2.044) 8.857*** (2.048)
HCLP×Employee stock ownership −0.171*** (0.065) −0.181*** (0.070)
Labor productivity −0.075** (0.032) −0.084** (0.032) −0.162***(0.053) −0.080** (0.032) −0.171*** (0.038)
Employee stock ownership 0.430 (0.828) 0.383 (0.822) 0.459 (0.829) 0.389 (0.819) 0.465 (0.826)
Firm age 0.179 (0.233) 0.217 (0.226) 0.274 (0.229) 0.215 (0.227) 0.272 (0.229)
Firm size 0.167** (0.067) 0.169*** (0.065) 0.170** (0.067) 0.170*** (0.065) 0.170** (0.067)
Public firm 0.842 (0.612) 0.830 (0.601) 0.899 (0.620) 0.829 (0.601) 0.897 (0.620)
Captive sourcing −0.479 (0.503) −0.516 (0.516) −0.600 (0.522) −0.514 (0.516) −0.598 (0.522)
Prior offshoring 0.226*** (0.110) 0.227*** (0.114) 0.231*** (0.112) 0.267*** (0.113) 0.281*** (0.114)
Firm performance 0.382*** (0.099) 0.377*** (0.099) 0.373*** (0.098) 0.377*** (0.099) 0.373*** (0.098)
Home country labor cost −0.173 (0.806) −1.060 (1.492) −1.115 (1.504) −1.072 (1.496) −1.126 (1.501)
Host country labor protection −0.319 (0.239) −0.337 (0.332) −0.343 (0.334) −0.337 (0.332) −0.344 (0.344)
Host country labor cost −0.339** (0.145) −0.345** (0.144) −0.345** (0.145) −0.345** (0.144) −0.340** (0.145)
Industry fixed effects Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Year fixed effects Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Constant −1.950*** (0.673) −1.090 (1.077) −1.161 (1.094) −1.081 (1.097) −1.152 (1.097)
Observations 19555 19555 19555 19555 19555
Log likelihood −183.227 −172.693 −162.824 −168.677 −160.809
Pseudo R2 0.359 0.369 0.386 0.372 0.386
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offshoring versus those with lower labor productivity. This pattern is
consistent with our Hypothesis 2. Similarly, Fig. 2 suggests that em-
ployee stock ownership is a crucial factor changing the relationship
between home country labor protection and firm offshoring. Overall,
these plots indicate that labor productivity and employee stock own-
ership are critical boundary conditions.
5.2. Two robustness checks3
5.2.1. Sub-period analyses
In our main analyses we study firms’ offshoring using a span of two
decades (1990–2010). Although this approach allows us to study off-
shoring in a more comprehensive manner, this method may not illu-
minate the nuances of each specific era. Here we addressed this issue in
two steps. First, we split the entire observation period into different
sub-periods including five-year and ten-year windows. We then esti-
mated the models separately using each sub-period. The results using
different observation windows are consistent with our main findings.
We also tested whether or not our sample firms experienced large-scale
changes during the complete observation period. Focusing on major
asset and employee reductions (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005), we found
that four firms experienced relatively large-scale changes during the
study period. We then re-estimated the model by removing them in
order to ensure that our results are not affected by these cases. Our
findings remained robust when these firms were excluded.
5.2.2. Alternative labor productivity measures
In studying the moderating effect of labor productivity, we used an
indicator that considers all input for a firm’s production process in
order to measure labor productivity. The literature suggests some al-
ternative measurements. For instance, Lieberman and Dhawan (2005:
1068) propose that a firm’s value added can be captured by considering
the difference between firm sales versus the costs of purchased mate-
rials and services (i.e., COGS). Similarly, human resource management
research also maintains that labor productivity can be measured using
firm sales per employee (Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005). We accord-
ingly developed these two alternative indicators of labor productivity
replacing the original labor productivity variable and then performed
additional analyses. In results not reported here, we found that our




At least two contributions emerge. First, our study contributes to the
home country literature (Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014, 2017;
Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015; Hoskisson et al., 2013). When stringent
labor protection hinders operational effectiveness, the home country
can become less supportive or even “unfriendly” (Hoskisson et al.,
2013: 1309). How do firms cope with this challenge? We contend that
firms operating within countries with stringent labor protection may
opt to undertake offshoring. This argument is crucial, since it highlights
that even developed home country contexts may prompt firms to con-
sider escaping. The literature suggests that EMNEs may actively engage
in outward FDI in order to escape from their home country constraints
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014, 2017; Luo & Wang, 2012; Xia
et al., 2014). We add to this literature by making and substantiating the
case that firms operating within developed countries may adopt similar
strategies. While developed home countries can confer superior re-
sources and assets, certain institutional arrangements such as labor
protection may make home countries less supportive (Witt & Lewin,
2007). Firms based in developed countries may in turn consider shifting
some operations overseas instead. As offshoring “requires a lower level
of resource commitment and permits firms to choose the supplier that
delivers the maximum advantage in each case” (Rodriguez & Nieto,
2016: 1738), it is more flexible than FDI. By undertaking offshoring,
firms based in home countries with higher levels of labor protection are
allowed to improve operational efficiency.
Second, our findings also contribute to both the VOC literature
(Carney et al., 2009; Jackson & Deeg, 2008) and the offshoring litera-
ture (Contractor et al., 2010; Lewin et al., 2009; Nieto & Rodriguez,
2011). Labor is recognized as a crucial element within a society (Van
Essen et al., 2013). Although strong labor protection enhances worker
welfare, this institutional arrangement can create challenges for firms.
Firms operating within countries that have greater labor protection may
consider offshoring proactively. Specifically, “firms will experience
competitive disadvantage if labor regulations fail to adjust to new reali-
ties” (Witt & Lewin, 2007: 582; emphasis added). Offshoring may ac-
cordingly represent one viable approach for firms responding to the
institutional challenges of domestic operations. Overall, from a labor
protection angle, this study contributes to the institution-based view
(Peng et al., 2008).
6.2. Practice implications
Our findings have several implications for managers and policy-
makers. One immediate implication is that managers should pay at-
tention to the issue of labor protection. Furthermore, managers must
evaluate the issue of labor protection by taking labor productivity and
employee stock ownership into analyses. While the effect of labor
Fig. 1. Interaction of Home Country Labor Protection and Labor Productivity
on Firm Offshoring.
Fig. 2. Interaction of Home Country Labor Protection and Employee Stock
Ownership on Firm Offshoring.
3 In the interest of space, results from these tests are not shown here but are available
on request.
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protection is more pronounced for firms with higher labor productivity,
labor protection within the home country are less impactful for firms
that adopt employee stock ownership. Firms employing more produc-
tive workers are therefore encouraged to keep an eye on the issue of
labor protection, and granting stock ownership may be one way to
better manage their employees.
At the same time our findings are also informative for policymakers.
Deregulations and the removal of trade barriers have made the global
market increasingly competitive, ultimately generating calls to loosen
labor protection in countries that previously provided greater worker
welfare considerations. Therefore, “when labor protection has become
excessive…labor market institutions must be reformed” (Kanter, 2006).
As policymakers decide to alter the institutions by engaging in reform
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2015), it is important to adopt a more integrative
perspective in balancing firm needs versus labor welfare. A one-side
view may not be able to make the best use of a nation’s resources.
6.3. Limitations and future research
Our paper has several limitations that provide opportunities for
future research. First, our sample firms are based in five developed
countries. However, labor protection is not limited to these countries.
Subsequent studies can examine emerging economies such as China and
India. Similarly, our research is based within a single industry (i.e., the
information technology). While this allows us to control for the industry
effect, how firms in other industries may react to home country labor
protection can be examined in the future.
Second, aside from labor, other actors (such as shareholders and
banks) within the home country are also crucial (Hall & Soskice, 2001).
Studies investigating other key actors would improve our under-
standing of how the broader socio-economic home country context may
influence firm strategies.
Finally, our study relies on content analyses while focusing on a
particular period (i.e., 1990–2010) to study firm offshoring. In order to
gain greater insight we encourage researchers to adopt other methods
(e.g., survey instruments and interviews) to study small- and medium-
sized firms as well as develop more refined indicators that capture firm
offshoring. For example, researchers can develop more sophisticated
measures such as the type (e.g., R&D) and number of functions that are
relocated to foreign nations. Doing so will enhance our understanding
of the association between home country context and firm offshoring.
7. Conclusion
How does home country labor protection influence firm offshoring?
Drawing on the home country literature (Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamutri,
2014, 2017; Marano et al., 2016; Xia et al., 2014), we contend that
home country labor protection may create institutional challenges for
domestic operations so that firms from these countries may actively
look toward foreign countries for resources via offshoring. Leveraging
this central argument, our study also examines the boundary conditions
that moderate the effect of home country labor protection including
labor productivity and employee stock ownership. Our findings suggest
that stringent home country labor protection will increase firm moti-
vations to undertake offshoring. Moreover, the effect of home country
labor protection will vary depending on labor productivity and em-
ployee stock ownership. These results collectively suggest that off-
shoring can be a partial exit strategy for firms coping with the chal-
lenges in their home countries. In closing, we suggest that while “home
sweet home” is part of our lexicon, policymakers, managers, and
scholars must be aware of the institutional impact of “home bitter
home.”
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